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Background
Technological	 advances	 are	 reshaping	 today’s	 elec-
tricity	 markets.	 More	 mature	 technologies	 for	 lo-
cal	renewable	generation	and	decreased	investment	




distributed	energy	 resources	 (DER),	 including	also	
local	storage,	electric	vehicles	or	demand	response,	
are	 driving	 or	 at	 least	 allowing	 for	 potentially	 sig-
nificant	changes	in	the	operation	of	power	systems.	






the	 same	 technologies	 that	 are	 causing	 substantial	




In	 the	 light	 of	 these	 changes,	 this	 THINK	 report	
discusses	 regulatory	 implications	of	 changing	 local	



















Figure 1: Relevant areas of regulation
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Existing regulation of DSOs needs to be 
reviewed in its full spectrum
The	market	penetration	of	DER	opens	possibilities	
for	decentralized	trade	of	energy.	These	trade	oppor-





of	 potentials	 that	DER	offer,	DSOs	have	 to	 under-
take	 significant	 upfront	 investments	 in	 grid	 (and	
Box 1: Electricity distribution in the EU – A patchwork of national systems
Today’s DSO landscape resembles a patchwork with diverse national implementations of relevant pieces of EU leg-
islation and resulting heterogeneous end-user market structures in different Member States. Substantial differences 
regard, amongst others, operated voltage levels, designation procedures, the scope of activities, the size and number 
of DSOs in a country, the level of unbundling, and applied regulatory schemes. Also the degree of retail market liberali-
zation and competition still varies significantly across the EU, even though full eligibility of customers is mandatory, and 
the choice of suppliers and tariffs generally increased over the recent years. 
Boundary	between	transmission	and	distribution	in	terms	of	operated	voltage	levels:	
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related)	infrastructures.	For	DER	to	flourish	and	to	
enable	 them	 to	 compete	with	 resources	 connected	
to	the	transmission	grid,	DSOs	also	have	to	provide	










As	 a	 consequence,	 existing	 regulation	 needs	 to	 be	
reviewed	in	its	full	spectrum.	This	full	spectrum	of	
DSO	 activities	 can	 be	 distinguished	 according	 to,	
first,	the	DSO’s	function	as	a	network	operator	and,	
second,	its	function	as	a	market	facilitator	along	the	
value	 chain	 (see	 Figure	 1).	 Reviewing	DSO	 incen-
tives	as	a	network	operator	implies	revisiting	regula-
tory	schemes	for	allowed	remuneration	and	result-




grid	charges	and	 the	structure	and	 format	of	 these	
charges	will	have	an	important	impact	on	grid	users’	





However,	 a	 common	 European	 approach	 to	 DSO	
regulation	 is	 hampered	 by	 substantially	 heteroge-
neous	 existing	 regulation	 and	 distribution	 system	
structures	 throughout	 the	EU.	Box	1	 illustrates	 the	
patchwork	of	different	national	distribution	systems.	
Therefore,	 the	 advent	 of	DER	will	 have	 a	 different	
impact	on	different	European	distribution	systems,	
and	hence,	 also	 regulatory	 responses	 should	differ,	
and	when	implemented	on	the	European	level,	leave	
room	for	diverse	national	implementation.	











ers.	At	 the	other	extreme,	 there	are	 systems	with	a	
substantial	penetration	of	DER	and	small-scale	con-
sumers	behaving	as	 active	prosumers.	 In	 such	 sys-
tems	power	flows	will	 become	much	more	volatile	
and	 the	 approach	 to	 system	management	 changes,	
with	 DSOs	 jointly	 coordinating	 local	 DER	 power	
flows	and	those	coming	from	the	transmission	grid,	
and	hence	managing	the	system	closer	to	real-time.




integrated	 operator	 being	 exempted	 from	 strict	
unbundling	 provisions.	 This	 for	 instance	 often	 is	
the	case	for	small	German	(“Stadtwerke”)	or	Span-
ish	 (“Cooperativas”)	utilities,	which	 also	 engage	 in	
other-than-energy	social	activities	within	 their	 ter-
ritory.	Insufficient	unbundling	biases	the	level-play-
ing	field	against	DER	and	 in	 favor	of	 conventional	
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technologies	especially	when	the	incumbent	retailer	
(that	 shares	 the	parent	firm	with	 the	DSO)	mostly	
markets	 electricity	 from	 upstream	 sources,	 and,	
thus,	poses	one	of	the	most	serious	obstacles	to	retail	
competition.
Key areas of DSO regulation and needed 
changes for DER integration
As	demonstrated	above,	four	key	areas	of	DSO	regu-
lation	have	 to	 be	 assessed	on	whether	 they	–	with	
massive	DER	penetration	–	still	deliver	the	desired	
regulatory	goals.
#1 – Adequate regulated DSO remuneration 
For	high	amounts	of	DER	connected	to	distribution	
systems,	 the	 total	 costs	 of	 business-as-usual	 man-
agement	of	distribution	networks	(that	is,	a	contin-
ued	 “fit-and-forget”	 grid	 management)	 will	 likely	
increase	 in	most	 systems.	 Yet,	 increasing	 amounts	
of	DER	have	a	twofold	impact	on	DSOs’	cost	struc-










uted	 energy	 resources	 allow	 for	 an	 active	distribu-
tion	system	management	and	have	the	potential	 to	
decrease	 the	 total	 costs	 of	DSOs	 compared	 to	 not	
relying	on	DER	in	local	system	management.	
Therefore,	 incentive	regulation	 for	DSOs	has	 to	al-
low	for	overall	higher	compensation	of	DSOs,	but	at	
the	 same	 time	 set	 sufficient	 incentives	 to	 invest	 in	




and	 CAPEX	 structures	 of	 DSOs,	 ii)	 the	 optimal	
choice	 among	 both,	 and	 of	 iii)	 how	 to	 incentivize	
DSOs	to	deploy	innovative	solutions.
#2 – Adequate distribution network tarification 
The	present	design	of	network	tariffs	does	not	pro-
vide	a	 level-playing	field	among	all	 agents	 that	use	
the	 distribution	 network.	With	 an	 increasing	 pen-
etration	 of	DER,	 ill-designed	 distribution	 network	
charges,	 such	 as	 volumetric	network	 charges	 com-
bined	 with	 net-metering,	 will	 become	 even	 more	
problematic.	 Business	 models	 exploiting,	 for	 in-
stance,	 inefficient	 arbitrage	 possibilities	 caused	 by	
differentiated	treatments	of	different	DER	technolo-
gies,	or	of	certain	types	of	producers	and	consumers,	
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quire	rights	to	ill-designed	subsidies.	A	continuation	







recovery,	 should	 be	 able	 to	 convey	 efficient	 eco-
nomic	 signals	 to	 the	 entire	diversity	of	 agents	 that	
may	connect	to	the	distribution	grid.	Tariffs	should	
reflect	the	true	costs	(or	benefits)	of	different	types	
of	 load	and	generation	 for	 the	distribution	system,	
which	will	depend	on	an	agent’s	geographic	location	
in	the	system	as	well	as	on	the	profile	of	 injection/
withdrawal	 from	 the	 connection	point.	A	network	
reference	model,	 as	 for	 example	already	applied	 in	
Spain	or	Sweden,	can	be	very	useful	to	evaluate	the	
different	components	of	distribution	network	charg-









#3 – DSO activities vis-à-vis the market
There	are	a	number	of	areas	in	the	newly	emerging	
market	 environment	 where	 there	 is	 no	 consensus	
about	whether	the	respective	tasks	should	be	under	
the	responsibility	of	 the	DSO	or	not.	Such	tasks	 in	
theory	may	be	 fulfilled	by	 regulated	agents	 (which	
could	be	the	DSO	or	also	a	third	regulated	party)	or	
















provided	 in	 a	 timely	 fashion,	 advantages	 lie	 in	 the	










dling	 are	 not	 fully	 satisfactory.	With	 an	 increasing	
penetration	of	DER	and	the	accompanying	advent	of	
new	market	actors	and	business	relations,	the	nega-
tive	 effects	 of	 limited	 unbundling	 might	 become	
aggravated.	 When	 mandatory	 ownership	 unbun-
dling	 is	 politically	 not	 enforceable,	 or	 is	 economi-
cally	 counterproductive	 for	 the	 customers’	 choice	
(through	a	drastic	reduction	of	suppliers	on	the	mar-
ket)	or	for	the	customers’	bill	(through	duplication	
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of	costs	in	separated	entities	or	loss	of	synergy	with	











respective	 DSOs	 changes	 with	 increasing	 penetra-
tion	 of	DER.	These	 additional	 requirements	 could	
mostly	center	around	the	use	of	customer	data	and	
transparency	 in	 procurement	 of	 services	 for	 DSO	










It	 has	 to	 be	 discussed	 if	 small DSOs	 that	want	 to	
engage	in	additional	tasks	as	introduced	above,	but	
which	currently	might	be	exempted	from	strict	un-
bundling	 requirements,	 should	 also	 be	 exempted	















cessing	 ICT	 infrastructure	 and	 finally	 relevant	 for	
trading	and	retailing	has	to	be	made	available	such	
that	barriers	to	market	entry	are	further	reduced.	
#4 – DSO activities vis-à-vis the TSO
When	moving	from	“passive	distribution	networks”	
towards	 “active	 distribution	 system	 management”,	
DSOs	 become	 more	 active	 system	 operators	 and	
the	existing	hosting	capacity	of	the	distribution	net-
work	can	be	used	more	efficiently	if	an	optimal	use	
of	 DER	 is	 considered.	Thus,	 DSOs	 become	 agents	
that	manage	 local	markets	 for	network	 services	 or	
directly	 purchase	 services	 with	 commercial	 value	
from	other	 agents,	 and	 their	 role	 and	organization	









Some	 of	 these	 products	 are	 relevant	 for	 either	 the	
TSO	 or	 the	 DSO,	 whereas	 other	 types	 of	 services	
might	be	of	interest	for	both	types	of	network	opera-
tors.	Hence,	coordination	and	information	exchange	
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DSOs	 and	 TSOs	 is	 needed	 the	more	 this	 product	
relates	to	real-time	trading.	Furthermore,	protocols	







generation	 with	 installed	 capacities	 considerably	
exceeding	 peak	 demand,	 or	 whether	 it	 contains	 a	
whole	portfolio	of	DER	including	also	non-negligi-




are	 part	 of	 the	 distribution	 activity.	 Coordination	
needs	probably	will	increase	when	DSOs	also	oper-
ate	MV	(or	even	HV)	grids.	










cation	 of	 EU	 guidelines	 to	 spread,	 encourage,	 and	










































































The Florence School of Regulation 
The Florence School of Regulation (FSR) was founded in 2004 as a partnership between the Council of the 
European Energy Regulators (CEER) and the European University Institute (EUI), and it works closely 
with the European Commission. The Florence School of Regulation, dealing with the main network indus-
tries, has developed a strong core of general regulatory topics and concepts as well as inter-sectoral discus-











Content © Authors, 2013
© European University Institute 2013
Q
M
-A
I-1
3-
10
5-
EN
-N
